← All Field NotesSecondary Tariffs on Russian Energy Buyers: Waived in October, Still on the Statute Book

Field Notes

Secondary Tariffs on Russian Energy Buyers: Waived in October, Still on the Statute Book

Jay Bimbrah

Jay Bimbrah

Co-Founder & COO

·November 14, 2026
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TL;DR: The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 gave the US president statutory power to put tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods from the largest buyers of Russian crude and gas. Executive Order 14436 waived those duties on 16 October 2026, but the waiver has no end date and can be withdrawn, so the exposure for any company sourcing from a big buyer country is switched off rather than removed.

Key takeaways:

  • H.R. 5334 was signed on 18 September 2026 and allows duties of up to 500 percent on Russian-origin goods and up to 100 percent on goods from countries that qualify as major buyers of Russian energy.
  • The duties were due to apply from 18 October 2026, and Executive Order 14436 waived them on 16 October.
  • The waiver stays in force until the President or the Secretary of State decides further action is appropriate, and the US Trade Representative must keep monitoring Russian oil and gas purchases.
  • Unlike the 25 percent India duty of 2025, which rested on emergency powers, these tariffs sit on an express statute, and the Supreme Court ruled in February 2026 that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs.

India has already lived through one US tariff penalty for buying Russian crude. In February 2026 the White House removed an extra 25 percent duty on Indian goods, imposed the previous August, after India committed to stop those purchases.[^1][^2] Seven months later Congress wrote a larger version of the same penalty into law. A month after that, the President waived it.[^3][^5]

The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, H.R. 5334, became law on 18 September 2026 and authorises duties of up to 100 percent on goods from qualifying buyer countries.
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, H.R. 5334, became law on 18 September 2026 and authorises duties of up to 100 percent on goods from qualifying buyer countries.

What the Graham Act Put on a Statutory Footing

The 2025 India duty was imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.[^1] On 20 February 2026 the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose tariffs.[^6][^7] Squire Patton Boggs read the Graham Act as a response to that gap: it places much of the US sanctions regime against Russia on an express statutory footing and gives the President explicit authority to impose tariffs.[^1]

  • Two rates, two targets. Section 112 allows duties of up to 500 percent on Russian-origin goods. Section 113 allows duties of up to 100 percent on goods from countries that meet the buyer test.[^4][^1] Both are ceilings. The 2025 bill had proposed tariffs of at least 500 percent, and the enacted text sets no numerical minimum.[^1]
  • The buyer test. A country qualifies if it knowingly made new purchases of Russian crude or gas from 30 days after enactment and was among the five largest importers by volume over the previous twelve months. Being among the five largest facilitators of oil sanctions evasion also counts.[^4]
  • The gas exception. A country whose imports were less than 15 percent of Russia's total natural gas exports is exempt from the gas limb. There is no equivalent exception for crude.[^4][^1]
  • The start date. Duties under both sections were to apply within 30 days of enactment, which Executive Order 14436 fixed as 18 October 2026.[^4][^5]

So a manufacturer importing components from a country that buys Russian crude in volume could have seen a duty of up to 100 percent on those components. The manufacturer would not be buying Russian oil itself and would not appear on any sanctions list. The cost would show up in landed cost and margin, not in a blocked payment, and no sanctions screen would flag it.

Executive Order 14436 of 16 October 2026 waived the duties in sections 112 and 113 of the Graham Act two days before they were due to apply, and set no end date for the waiver.
Executive Order 14436 of 16 October 2026 waived the duties in sections 112 and 113 of the Graham Act two days before they were due to apply, and set no end date for the waiver.

Energy Trade Compliance When the Penalty Is a Tariff

This is the mechanism that separates a secondary tariff from the secondary sanctions we covered in August. Secondary sanctions reach a company through its transactions and its banks. A secondary tariff reaches it through the country of origin on a customs entry. Screening counterparties against designation lists catches the first and misses the second entirely, because the exposure attaches to a whole economy. The two also behave differently over time. A designation names a party and stays until someone removes it. A section 113 tariff depends on a ranking of buyers over the previous twelve months, so a country can move into or out of scope as its purchases change.[^4]

The waiver signed on 16 October is broad. Section 4(a) of Executive Order 14436 waives any duties under sections 112 and 113, and section 4(c) waives a set of the Act's sanctions provisions.[^5] It is not tied to any one country. EcoNiti, reporting on India, noted that it could also benefit China.[^8] Section 4(b) leaves in place every sanction already imposed by executive order under the existing Russia national emergency.[^5]

What makes this a live geopolitical risk rather than a closed file is the duration clause. The waivers remain in effect until the President or the Secretary of State, consulting Treasury and the Trade Representative, determines that further action is appropriate.[^5] Section 3 directs the Trade Representative to monitor countries' purchases of Russian crude and gas and to tell the President promptly of anything that might call for action on the waivers.[^5] The order sets no end date, and reversing it needs no vote in Congress.

What the record shows: a week before the waiver, on 9 October, OFAC issued General License 135, authorising transactions for the sale, delivery and importation of Russian-origin diesel.[^9][^10] What we infer: the October measures look like a negotiating position, with the tariff instrument held in reserve. That is our interpretation; neither the order nor OFAC says so.

The White House removed the additional 25 percent duty on Indian goods linked to Russian crude purchases with effect from 7 February 2026, after India committed to stop those purchases.
The White House removed the additional 25 percent duty on Indian goods linked to Russian crude purchases with effect from 7 February 2026, after India committed to stop those purchases.

Building the Reversal Into Sourcing Plans

What we recommend: treat the waived duty as a scenario with a known ceiling and an unknown trigger.

  1. Map origin, not counterparty. List the countries of origin on your US import entries and mark those that rank among the largest buyers of Russian crude or gas. That list, not the sanctions screening output, is the exposure.
  2. Price the ceiling once. Run the landed cost of those flows at the statutory maximum of 100 percent. Most firms will find a handful of lines where that number decides the sourcing choice, and those lines are the ones worth a second source now.
  3. Watch the monitor. The Trade Representative's reporting under section 3 is where a reversal would start.1 A change in a big buyer's Russian purchases, or a stalled negotiation, is the signal to check. Countries close to the edge of the top five deserve the most attention, because a modest shift in volumes can move them across the line.
  4. Write the trigger into contracts. A change-in-law clause should name a reinstated statutory tariff, not only a new one. Our note on vessel-level exposure covers the shipping side of the same Russian energy trade. Sector context for energy buyers is on our energy sector page.

Fortius Intel note: If your supplier base includes a top-five buyer of Russian crude, put the 100 percent scenario in front of the risk committee this quarter, while it costs nothing to discuss. A waiver that one official can withdraw is a short planning horizon, and the first sign of withdrawal is more likely to sit in a monitoring report than in a press release.

Methodology: this note draws on primary texts from the White House (Executive Orders 14384 and 14436, and the signing statement for H.R. 5334), the enrolled bill on govinfo, the Supreme Court opinions index and OFAC; law firm analysis from Squire Patton Boggs and Husch Blackwell; and reporting by EcoNiti and Egypt Oil and Gas. Each figure was checked against a second independent source where one exists. India import volumes were cut because the available figures traced to a single data provider. This is not legal advice.


Footnotes

  1. The White House, "Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026," Executive Order 14436, 16 October 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/ (retrieved 7 November 2026). Source for: the 18 October 2026 application date; section 4(a) waiver of duties under sections 112 and 113; section 4(b) preservation of existing executive order sanctions; section 4(c) waiver of listed sanctions; section 4(d) duration until the President or the Secretary of State determines further action is appropriate; section 3 monitoring by the Trade Representative. ↩

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About the author

Jay Bimbrah, Co-Founder & COO. A former Scotland Yard counter-terrorism investigator, Jay has advised EMEA tier-1 banks and Lloyd's market firms on distinguishing real exposure from theoretical risk.