
Field Notes
US Midterms Business Impact: What a Democratic Congress Can and Cannot Change on Tariffs, Sanctions and Export Controls
TL;DR: The 3 November midterms gave Democrats control of both chambers, but most US tariffs now rest on Sections 232, 301 and 338, which Congress cannot repeal without a two-thirds vote to beat a veto. The new majority can do more on Russia sanctions, chip export rules moving through the defence bill, and oversight, so companies should plan for tariffs to stay where they are.
Key takeaways:
- The AP called the Senate for Democrats late on 3 November and the House early on 4 November, with two Senate races still uncalled.
- The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 on 20 February 2026 that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs, which moved the tariff base onto statutes Congress wrote decades ago.
- Section 301 forced labour tariffs of 10 or 12.5 percent on 60 economies have applied since 24 July 2026.
- The Russia sanctions act passed the Senate 86-11 in 2026, then most of it was waived by executive order within a month.
- Senate chip export provisions sit in a defence bill that stalled in July, so the lame-duck session decides their fate before the new Congress meets.
"We therefore do not anticipate national politics to directly impact business conditions over the short term," Andrew Adair of the German engineering association VDMA told Reuters the day after the vote.[^1] He was talking about a Democratic sweep. Democrats won at least 54 Senate seats and, by the AP count on 4 November, at least 228 in the House, with dozens of races still open.[^2][^3] For a company's tariff bill, Adair is probably right. For its sanctions and export control exposure, he may not be.

Tariff Authority Now Sits in Statutes, Not Emergencies
The legal ground under US tariffs moved twice this year, and both moves matter more than the election.
- The IEEPA ruling. On 20 February 2026 the Supreme Court held 6-3 in Learning Resources v. Trump that the emergency powers law does not let the President impose tariffs.[^4][^5]
- The 150-day bridge. The administration replaced those duties with a 10 percent surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act, which caps such a surcharge at 15 percent and 150 days unless Congress extends it by law.[^6][^7] Congress did not act, and the surcharge expired on 24 July.[^7]
- The replacement. From 24 July, USTR applied Section 301 tariffs of 10 or 12.5 percent to 60 economies for failing to ban imports made with forced labour.[^8][^7] Importers are challenging them at the Court of International Trade.[^7]
- Canada. On 20 July the President used Section 338 for the first time, imposing 50 percent duties on about US$20 billion of Canadian goods.[^9]
Section 232 tariffs stayed in place throughout.[^4] Baker McKenzie's post-election note calls Sections 301 and 232 "the most legally durable tariff authorities."[^10] None of them needs a vote in Congress to continue. That changes what the election can do. In October 2025, the Senate voted to end the emergencies behind the Brazil, Canada and global tariffs with between 50 and 52 senators in favour each time, and in February 2026 the House followed on Canada by 219 to 211.[^11][^12] Those votes targeted IEEPA. After the Court's ruling, the duties that remain do not rest on an emergency that Congress can vote to end.

The Levers Congress Holds, Ranked by Reach
What the record shows: a law that narrows the President's tariff powers would meet a veto. Pierre Yared of the Council on Foreign Relations put it plainly: "Repealing or constraining those authorities over a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers."[^13] The Senate vote on the Russia sanctions act shows that a majority that large is possible on sanctions, at least in the Senate. Nothing in the tariff record shows the same.
What we infer: the new Congress has four tools, and their reach on a company's costs runs from strong to weak.
- Sanctions pressure. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 passed the Senate 86-11 and was signed on 18 September. It allows secondary duties of up to 100 percent on goods from the biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas.[^14] On 16 October, Executive Order 14436 waived all of its duties and most of its Russia measures, with no end date.[^14][^15] Baker McKenzie expects Democrats to try to strip the President of that waiver power.[^10] Separately, section 216 of the 2017 CAATSA law already gives Congress a 30-day window to review any easing of the Russia sanctions it covers, and to block it by joint resolution.[^16]
- Export control law. Senators placed chip export provisions, including a measure to write the licence requirement for advanced AI chips to China into law, in their version of the 2027 defence bill.[^17] That bill passed the House 216-212 on 22 July and failed a Senate procedural vote 50-46 on 14 July.[^18] The first chance to settle their fate is the lame-duck session, before the new majority is seated.
- Oversight. Committee chairs can call hearings, demand documents and subpoena officials.[^13] Baker McKenzie expects subpoenas on how IEEPA tariff refunds are being handled.[^10] Hearings do not change a duty rate. They can bring out what an agency plans to do next.
- Tariff legislation. Bills that would require Congress to approve new tariffs need a veto-proof majority to become law.[^10][^13] Read a new bill as a sign of what a committee plans to investigate.

Reading the Political Risk Calendar Before 3 January
The new Congress is sworn in on 3 January 2027.1 Between now and then, the old Congress still controls the defence bill, and USTR has said it will issue recommendations from a separate Section 301 investigation into industrial overcapacity by the end of 2026.2 For most companies, that recommendation matters more for 2027 costs than any vote in the new Congress.
What to run instead of an election-driven tariff forecast:
- Price tariffs at today's rates through 2027. Hold the forced labour Section 301 rates, Section 232 rates and the Canada duties in the base case, and model a possible overcapacity round on top.2
- Track the court cases separately from Congress. The Section 301 and Section 338 actions are both being challenged at the Court of International Trade, and a ruling could move rates faster than legislation.32
- Treat Russia exposure as the live variable. If a Democratic Congress limits the waiver, secondary duties on buyers of Russian energy could return. Map which suppliers sit in countries that buy the most Russian crude or gas.4
- Watch the lame-duck defence bill for chip rules. A licence requirement written into statute is harder for a future administration to waive than one held in a Commerce regulation.
The geopolitical risk here sits in which instruments the winners can actually reach. The trade war planning note sets out how to plan around tariff rounds, and the 2027 outlook note covers how to turn forecasts into company exposure. The Fortius Intel brief tracks these dates as they move.
Fortius Intel note: Our view is that this election changes US sanctions risk more than US tariff risk. A sanctions law that passed 86-11 and was waived within a month is the clearest test of what a hostile Congress can do. Companies that buy from big importers of Russian energy should put that waiver on their 2027 watch list ahead of any tariff vote.
Methodology: this note draws on election reporting from Forbes, Al Jazeera and the AP, law firm analysis from King & Spalding, Jones Day, Holland & Knight, White & Case, Baker McKenzie, Freshfields and Foley & Lardner, USTR and CRS documents, the US Code, and CFR expert commentary. Each figure was checked against a second independent source where one exists. Seat counts were still moving on the day of drafting. This is not legal advice.
Footnotes
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Council on Foreign Relations, "Democrats Win Control of Congress. Here's How That Could Affect U.S. Foreign Policy.," 4 November 2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/democrats-win-control-of-congress-heres-how-that-could-affect-u-s-foreign-policy (retrieved 5 November 2026). Source for: the Pierre Yared quote on the two-thirds majority; committee chairs' power to hold hearings, demand documents and subpoena officials; the new Congress sworn in on 3 January 2027. ↩
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Foley & Lardner (via The National Law Review), weekly international trade update for 2 November 2026, 3 November 2026, https://natlawreview.com/article/tariff-ied-week-international-trade-november-2-2026 (retrieved 5 November 2026). Source for: USTR issuing recommendations from the Section 301 overcapacity investigation by the end of 2026; the Section 338 action being challenged at the Court of International Trade. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Holland & Knight, "And the Tariff Beat Goes On," 30 July 2026, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/07/and-the-tariff-beat-goes-on (retrieved 5 November 2026). Source for: the Section 122 tariffs expiring on 23-24 July 2026; the Section 301 forced labour tariffs taking effect at 12:01 a.m. on 24 July; and the importer challenge at the Court of International Trade. Cross-check of the 10 percent rate and expiry: Z2Data, analysis of the termination of the Section 122 tariffs, 28 July 2026, https://www.z2data.com/insights/how-the-termination-of-section-122-tariffs-impacts-your-supply-chain/ (retrieved 5 November 2026). ↩
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Freshfields, "The Graham Act: Bipartisan Sanctions and Tariffs Waived," 30 October 2026, https://www.freshfields.com/en/our-thinking/blogs/a-fresh-take/the-graham-act-bipartisan-sanctions-and-tariffs-waived-102o735 (retrieved 5 November 2026). Source for: the Act's name; signature on 18 September 2026; the 86-11 Senate vote; secondary duties of up to 100 percent on goods from the top importers of Russian crude or gas; Executive Order 14436 of 16 October 2026 waiving all duties and most Russia measures; waivers with no fixed end date. ↩
About the author
Shekhar Attri, Co-Founder & CTO. An Indian Army Special Forces veteran with 21 years of service and a gallantry medal, Shekhar's corporate security advisory work spans Singapore, India, the Philippines, and the UAE, alongside PhD research on machine intelligence under incomplete information.