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Field Notes

Taiwan Contingency Planning: What the Revised Continuity Plans Still Leave Out

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TL;DR: Foreign companies in Taiwan are rewriting their continuity plans, yet the survey that tracks them measures how many are planning, not what they plan for. The scenario CSIS and Continuum Economics rate likelier than a blockade is a coast guard quarantine that keeps ports open and asks shippers to file with Chinese customs, and that turns a continuity plan into a compliance decision with a 48-hour clock.

Key takeaways:

  • AmCham Taiwan's 2026 Business Climate Survey found 46 percent of respondents revising business continuity plans, up from 40 percent, while 27 percent were taking no resilience action at all.
  • From 7 June 2026, China Coast Guard and maritime safety vessels east of Taiwan radioed at least three merchant ships for their ports of departure and destination; Taiwan told ships to ignore the calls.
  • In the CSIS quarantine scenarios, Beijing would count compliance by around 75 percent of shipping companies as a considerable success, and would threaten fines and market access limits for the rest.
  • Taiwan's LNG storage covers about 11 days of consumption, against 14 to 20 days in Japan and South Korea, and gas supplies roughly half of its power generation.

In the second week of June 2026, Chinese coast guard ships east of Taiwan started asking passing merchant vessels by radio where they had come from and where they were going. Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration said at least three ships received the calls, none was boarded or approached, and it broadcast to all of them that they should pay no attention.[^1][^2] Nothing was stopped, but each master on those bridges had to decide whether to answer, and that is the kind of decision most corporate plans for Taiwan have never written down.

In AmCham Taiwan's 2026 survey of 206 member companies, 46 percent were revising business continuity plans, up from 40 percent, while only 7 percent reported significant disruption from cross-Strait tension in 2025.
In AmCham Taiwan's 2026 survey of 206 member companies, 46 percent were revising business continuity plans, up from 40 percent, while only 7 percent reported significant disruption from cross-Strait tension in 2025.

What the AmCham Numbers Show, and What They Leave Open

The survey most foreign boards read on Taiwan is AmCham Taiwan's annual Business Climate Survey. The 2026 edition drew responses from 206 of 411 eligible member companies between 18 November and 21 December 2025, shortly before China's "Justice Mission 2025" exercises.[^3][^5]

  • Planning is rising. 46 percent said they were revising continuity plans to bolster resilience, against 40 percent a year earlier, and 36 percent were readjusting supply chains.[^4][^5]
  • Disruption is not. Only 7 percent reported significant disruption from cross-Strait tension in 2025, and 35 percent reported no impact.[^3][^6]
  • Commitment holds. 92 percent plan to maintain or increase investment in Taiwan in 2026.[^3][^5]
  • A quarter are doing nothing. 27 percent said they were not taking any action to strengthen business resilience in Taiwan.[^4]

The exercises that followed the survey window showed what the planners are up against. On 29 and 30 December 2025 the PLA Eastern Theater Command ran drills to blockade Taiwan's main ports, with state media naming Keelung in the north and Kaohsiung in the south. Reuters reported them as the largest round to date by area and the closest yet to the island.[^7][^8]

The survey records how many companies are revising plans, not what those plans assume. What we infer: a plan sized to the December drills prepares for ports that close, staff who leave and production that stops. The quarantine scenario that CSIS rates likelier does none of those things at the outset.

CSIS mapped a quarantine in which China announces enhanced customs inspection rules, requires advance declarations for Taiwan-bound cargo and brings the rules into force 48 hours later.
CSIS mapped a quarantine in which China announces enhanced customs inspection rules, requires advance declarations for Taiwan-bound cargo and brings the rules into force 48 hours later.

Business Continuity Plans Written for the Wrong Scenario

The Center for Strategic and International Studies separates a quarantine from a blockade. A blockade is military. A quarantine is led by the coast guard and other law enforcement bodies, and its aim is to impose controls on Taiwan's trade rather than seal the island off, so food and medicine could keep arriving.[^9] CSIS judged a quarantine likelier than an invasion or blockade in the near term.

Its scenarios begin with an announcement of "enhanced customs inspection rules" that require advance declarations to Chinese authorities for cargo bound for Taiwan, taking effect 48 hours later. Enforcement concentrates off Kaohsiung, which handled an estimated 57 percent of Taiwan's maritime trade in 2022. Beijing threatens fines and market access restrictions for companies that ignore the rules, and CSIS reckoned that compliance by around 75 percent of shipping companies would count as a considerable success.[^9][^10]

Continuum Economics raised its probability of a full quarantine of Taiwan shipping in 2027 or 2028 to 20 percent, from 10 to 15 percent, citing the coast guard's recent radio calls, while keeping blockade or invasion at 5 to 10 percent.[^11] That is one firm's judgement, not a forecast to plan on, but it points the same way as CSIS.

Christopher Eylward, writing in RealClearDefense in October 2026, set out how such a measure would bite through commercial channels: underwriters add war-risk premiums, and shipmasters invoke safe-port clauses and divert cargo.[^10] What we infer: a quarantine reaches a company first through its forwarder, its insurer and its customs broker, and each of them will ask the company what it wants done.

Power is the second gap. More than 97 percent of Taiwan's energy is imported, and its LNG storage covers about 11 days of consumption, against 14 to 20 days in Japan and South Korea.[^12][^13] Gas supplies roughly half of Taiwan's power generation.[^14] After the Hormuz closure stopped Qatari cargoes reaching Kaohsiung's Yongan terminal from early March 2026, Taiwan avoided a shortfall by buying spot LNG at more than double long-term contract prices.[^14] A quarantine that slowed tanker arrivals by days would test the same margin. For a manufacturer, that is the point where geopolitical risk shows up on the factory floor, as a power-rationing notice rather than a missile.

Taiwan holds about 11 days of LNG inventory, against 14 to 20 days in Japan and South Korea, and gas supplies roughly half of its power generation.
Taiwan holds about 11 days of LNG inventory, against 14 to 20 days in Japan and South Korea, and gas supplies roughly half of its power generation.

Three Tests for Taiwan Contingency Planning in 2027

What we recommend: run each revised plan against these three questions before the January 2028 elections, which Continuum names as the next pivot point.1

  1. Who decides on compliance, and how fast? If Chinese authorities demand advance declarations for Taiwan-bound cargo, a company has about 48 hours, in the CSIS timeline, to tell its forwarders whether to file. Taipei's guidance in June was to ignore Chinese radio calls.23 The plan should name the executive who makes that call, the legal advice it rests on, and the customers who must be told either way.
  2. Does the plan work with the ports open? Test a version in which Taiwan keeps trading at a higher cost: dearer cover, carriers diverting under safe-port clauses and slower clearance at Kaohsiung. Measure inventory days against that, not against a full closure, and check which customer contracts allow for delay without a force majeure claim.
  3. Is power treated as an input with a shelf life? Ask Taiwan sites and their suppliers what load they would shed first on a short gas supply, and how long a fab or test line takes to restart after a cut.

Our note on semiconductor chokepoints beyond the fab covers the supply chain side, and country risk monitoring between annual reviews covers how to watch the signals. Our wider approach is on the country risk analysis page.

Fortius Intel note: The open question for 2027 is whether China's coast guard moves from radio calls to boarding. If it does, the first decision a company in Taiwan faces will be whether to comply with a Chinese customs rule, not whether to evacuate staff. Ask your Taiwan team today who would make that call, and how long they would take.

Methodology: this note draws on AmCham Taiwan's 2026 Business Climate Survey and its press release, with Taipei Times, Taiwan News and Reuters coverage as cross-checks; Taiwan Coast Guard Administration statements as reported by the Taipei Times and Marine Insight; Reuters and The Aviationist on the December 2025 drills; the CSIS China Power Project quarantine scenarios; Continuum Economics and RealClearDefense analysis; and AmCham Taiwan, Atlantic Council and Bloomberg reporting on Taiwan's energy reserves. Probability figures are a single firm's judgement and are labelled as such. Single-source figures are marked in the footnotes.


Footnotes

  1. Continuum Economics, "Taiwan: China Coastguard Quarantine Risks Grow," 10 August 2026, https://continuumeconomics.com/a/578b6474 (retrieved 11 November 2026). Source for: the probability of a full quarantine of Taiwan shipping raised to 20 percent from 10 to 15 percent for 2027 or 2028; blockade and invasion kept at 5 to 10 percent; January 2028 elections as a pivotal date. Single source: one firm's published judgement. ↩

  2. Taipei Times, "China Coast Guard harassing merchant ships: CGA," 10 June 2026, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/06/10/2003858841 (retrieved 11 November 2026). Source for: China Coast Guard and Hai Xun vessels broadcasting to at least three commercial ships since Sunday 7 June 2026 to ask for ports of departure and destination; ships not boarded, inspected, approached or interfered with; Taiwan's coast guard telling ships to pay no heed; Joseph Wu's call for vessels to ignore the radio calls. ↩

  3. CSIS China Power Project, "How China Could Quarantine Taiwan: Mapping Out Two Possible Scenarios," 5 June 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-china-could-quarantine-taiwan-mapping-out-two-possible-scenarios (retrieved 11 November 2026). Source for: the distinction between a law enforcement-led quarantine and a military blockade; food and medicine continuing to flow; a quarantine judged likelier than invasion or blockade in the near term; "enhanced customs inspection rules" requiring advance declarations; entry into force 48 hours after announcement; fines and market access restrictions; around 75 percent shipping compliance as a considerable success; an estimated 57 percent of Taiwan's maritime trade entering through Kaohsiung in 2022. ↩

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About the author

Shekhar Attri, Co-Founder & CTO. An Indian Army Special Forces veteran with 21 years of service and a gallantry medal, Shekhar's corporate security advisory work spans Singapore, India, the Philippines, and the UAE, alongside PhD research on machine intelligence under incomplete information.