TL;DR: Japan's Economic Security Management Guidelines, published by METI on 23 January 2026, are voluntary, but METI says following them can help show that management met its duty of due care. Most Japanese manufacturers have not yet built the structure the guidelines describe, while the 2026 legal amendments around them are already in force or close to it.
Key takeaways:
- A 2026 survey cited in Japan's manufacturing white paper found 55.6 percent of manufacturers reporting economic security measures, against 38.2 percent in fiscal 2024.
- Only 2.0 percent of those firms set up a new dedicated department, and 37.9 percent had no dedicated structure and handled issues case by case.
- The guidelines ask for an executive officer or more senior executive in charge of economic security and a command centre function inside the company.
- The amended Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act generally applies from 4 January 2027 and adds divestment orders for breached mitigation commitments.
Fifty-six percent of Japanese manufacturers now say they are doing something about economic security. Two percent report setting up a dedicated department for it.[^3] That gap matters more after January 2026, when the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) told company leaders what it expects them to own.[^1]

Most Firms Are Still at the Information-Gathering Stage
Economic security here means a state's effort to keep critical supply, technology and infrastructure out of reach of foreign coercion. Japan wrote that aim into law in 2022, and the 2026 white paper on manufacturing shows how far companies have followed.[^6][^4]
- Activity is rising. The share of manufacturers reporting any measure rose from 38.2 percent in fiscal 2024 to 55.6 percent in fiscal 2025.[^3] Jiji Press, reporting the white paper, put the rise at about 40 to about 60 percent.[^4]
- Depth is thin. Strengthening information management and cybersecurity was the most common step, at 30.7 percent, followed by changing or diversifying parts suppliers at 27.2 percent.[^3] Jiji summarised the paper as finding that only about 30 percent of companies had taken substantive measures.[^4]
- Structure is rare. Only 2.0 percent created a new dedicated department, while 37.9 percent had no dedicated structure and responded as needed.[^3]
- Precedents exist. Mitsubishi Electric set up a Corporate Economic Security Division under the direct control of its president on 1 October 2020.[^9] Fujitsu created an Economic Security Office and a corporate executive officer post covering it from 1 December 2021.[^10]
What we infer: the survey describes companies that read about economic security but have not assigned anyone to act on it. Two large exporters built that structure five years before the government asked for it, so what is missing is priority. The gap also matters to foreign firms. A European or American supplier to a Japanese manufacturer may find that its customer has no single person who can answer a question about origin, technology access or dual sourcing. When that customer does appoint someone, the questions will come back up the supply chain in a burst, often as new contract clauses.

A Regulatory Text With No Obligation and a Duty-of-Care Hook
The guidelines say plainly that they "do not impose obligations on companies."[^1] The same document says that efforts in line with them may generally serve as one basis for showing that management fulfilled its duty of due care.[^1] Baker McKenzie reads that more firmly: following the guidelines may serve as evidence that directors and officers met that duty, which makes them hard to ignore in practice.[^2]
What the guidelines ask for is specific. Economic security measures should be treated as an important management matter, with executives exercising leadership themselves.[^1] Companies should designate an executive officer or higher-level executive in charge and set up a command centre function.[^1][^2] The document's two strategic aims are autonomy, which means avoiding excessive concentration of procurement, supply or production bases, and indispensability, which means protecting the core technologies that make a company hard to replace.[^1] Executives are also expected to explain these risks to stakeholders in their own words and on a regular basis.[^1]
The guidelines do not stand alone. On 20 November 2025 the Japan Fair Trade Commission, METI and the transport ministry published a casebook of 15 hypothetical cases on how the Antimonopoly Act treats information exchange, joint conduct and business combinations carried out for economic security reasons.[^11] That answers a question boards ask early: whether working with competitors for economic security reasons breaks competition law.

What Economic Security Duties Mean for the Board
The voluntary guidelines sit beside two amended laws with real force. The amendment to the Economic Security Promotion Act was promulgated on 17 June 2026 as Law No. 38.1 Its main provisions took effect on 18 September 2026, adding the medical sector to the core infrastructure regime and extending supply support to services such as cable laying and satellite launches.2 The revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act was passed on 29 May 2026 and promulgated on 5 June.34 It covers indirect acquisitions, makes mitigation commitments formal notification items and allows corrective orders, including divestment, when they are breached.34 A new interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in Japan was set up on 29 June 2026, and the regime generally applies from 4 January 2027.35
What we recommend: a board that wants to show it took the guidelines seriously should be able to produce five things on request.
- A named owner. One executive officer or above, in writing, with authority to instruct the departments that act in a crisis.6
- A dependency list. Single-source inputs and concentrated production bases, ranked by how long the company could run without them.
- A technology register. The core technologies that make the company indispensable, with who can access them and where they are made.
- A deal checklist. Whether any planned investment, joint venture or minority stake now falls under the revised FEFTA, including indirect acquisitions, from January 2027.3
- A disclosure line. One paragraph management can say to investors and lenders about these risks without legal drafting.
None of these is required by law. Each one is something a director would want on file if a regulator, a court or a shareholder later asked what the board knew and when.
The geopolitical risk behind all five is the same: the Japanese state now treats some private supply chains and technologies as national assets, and it has the tools to act on that view. Foreign companies with Japanese subsidiaries or Japanese partners should expect those partners to start asking for the same five items. The European picture runs in the same direction. A survey of 228 European companies published on 14 September 2026 found that only a third discuss economic security at management level at least monthly.7 For a wider view of how these rules change market entry, see our note on economic security and market entry, and for the mapping step, strategic dependencies. Sector context is on our manufacturing page.
Fortius Intel note: Name the economic security executive before the FEFTA amendments apply on 4 January 2027. A company that waits until its first filing under the revised regime will be building the structure in the middle of a review, which is the worst moment to discover who owns the answer.
Methodology: this note draws on METI's English translation of the guidelines, METI and Cabinet Office documents, the House of Representatives law record, the Ministry of Finance, the 2026 manufacturing white paper as reported by MONOist and Jiji Press, company releases from Mitsubishi Electric and Fujitsu, law firm analysis from Baker McKenzie and Orrick, and the MERICS and Bertelsmann European Business Survey. Each figure was checked against a second source where one exists. The "about 30 percent" figure is Jiji's summary; the white paper's own breakdown is given alongside it. This is not legal advice.
Footnotes
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House of Representatives of Japan, law record for Act No. 38 of 2026 amending the Economic Security Promotion Act and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Act, https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/housei/22120260617038.htm (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: promulgation on 17 June 2026 as Law No. 38; staggered commencement provisions. ↩
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Cabinet Office of Japan, summary of the amended Economic Security Promotion Act, https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/suishinhou/supply_chain/doc/sc_kaiseigaiyo.pdf (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: main commencement on 18 September 2026; the 2022 Act's first commencement on 1 August 2022; addition of the medical sector to core infrastructure; support extended to services such as cable laying and satellite launches. ↩
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Orrick, "Japan Passes Major Reform of Foreign Investment Screening Regime Under FEFTA," 1 July 2026, https://www.orrick.com/en/Insights/2026/06/Japan-Passes-Major-Reform-of-Foreign-Investment-Screening-Regime-Under-FEFTA (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: Diet passage on 29 May 2026; promulgation on 5 June 2026; coverage of indirect acquisitions; mitigation commitments as formal notification items; corrective orders including divestiture for non-compliance. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Ministry of Finance of Japan, Finance magazine, August 2026 issue, article on the FEFTA amendment, https://www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/202608/202608d.html (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: cross-check of passage on 29 May 2026 and promulgation on 5 June 2026; coverage of indirect acquisitions; creation of the Committee on Foreign Investment in Japan (JFIC) on 29 June 2026. ↩ ↩2
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Orrick, "Japan Finalizes Implementing Regulations for Revised FEFTA Foreign Investment Screening Regime, Part 1," November 2026, https://www.orrick.com/en/Insights/2026/11/Japan-Finalizes-Implementing-Regulations-for-Revised-FEFTA-Foreign-Investment-Screening-Regime-Pt-1 (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: implementing orders promulgated on 16 September 2026 and the revised regime generally taking effect on 4 January 2027. ↩
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Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, "Economic Security Management Guidelines (1st Edition), Tentative translation," 23 January 2026, https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/economic_security/guidelineenglish.pdf (retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: the 23 January 2026 date; the statement that the guidelines "do not impose obligations on companies"; efforts in line with the guidelines serving as one basis for showing management fulfilled its duty of due care; economic security as an important management matter with executive leadership; designation of an executive officer or higher-level executive in charge and a command centre function; the autonomy and indispensability aims; executives communicating risks in their own words on a regular basis; executives issuing direct instructions in a crisis. ↩
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MERICS, "European Business Survey: Bridging the gap between geopolitics and corporate strategy," 14 September 2026, https://merics.org/en/external-publication/european-business-survey-bridging-gap-between-geopolitics-and-corporate, cross-checked with Bertelsmann Stiftung, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/european-business-survey-bridging-the-gap-between-geopolitics-and-corporate-strategy (both retrieved 8 November 2026). Source for: a sample of 228 companies surveyed between November 2025 and January 2026; only one third of respondents discussing economic security at management level at least monthly. ↩
About the author
Jay Bimbrah, Co-Founder & COO. A former Scotland Yard counter-terrorism investigator, Jay has advised EMEA tier-1 banks and Lloyd's market firms on distinguishing real exposure from theoretical risk.
