TL;DR: Nigeria agreed on March 2, 2026 to split the OPL 245 oilfield, a nine-billion-barrel block that has never produced oil, into four licences with Eni and Shell, ending a twenty-eight-year dispute that outlasted five presidents. The delay shows Nigeria treats licence renewal and fiscal-term revision as one negotiation, a geopolitical risk pattern for boards in resource-nationalist markets.
Key takeaways:
- Nigeria awarded OPL 245 to Malabu Oil and Gas in April 1998 for a twenty-million-dollar signature bonus while Dan Etete secretly controlled Malabu as petroleum minister.
- The Milan Tribunal acquitted Eni, Shell, and thirteen individuals of bribery charges in March 2021, and Italy's prosecutors withdrew their appeal in July 2022.
- Nigeria withdrew its remaining 1.1 billion dollar civil claims against Eni and Shell in Italy in November 2023.
On March 2, 2026, Reuters reported that Nigeria's government had agreed to split the OPL 245 oilfield into four licences with Eni and Shell, ending a standoff that began in 1998 and outlasted five presidents.¹ The block holds an estimated nine billion barrels of oil equivalent and has never produced a barrel.² For boards evaluating frontier and resource-nationalist concessions, the relevant fact is not that the dispute ended. It is that a routine licence question sat unresolved for twenty-eight years because it kept becoming useful to someone in power.

The Geostrategic Anatomy of a Stalled Licence
OPL 245 was never a simple exploration permit. Nigeria awarded it to Malabu Oil and Gas in April 1998 for a twenty-million-dollar signature bonus while Dan Etete, who secretly controlled Malabu, served as petroleum minister.³ The Obasanjo government revoked the licence in 2001, and it changed hands repeatedly before a 2011 settlement transferred rights to Shell and Eni for roughly 1.1 billion dollars, later cited in Italian filings as 1.3 billion dollars once signature bonuses were included.² Prosecutors alleged more than a billion dollars of that payment was diverted to politicians and intermediaries rather than the Nigerian treasury.
The file that followed illustrates how a licence dispute compounds across unrelated political cycles:
- Criminal exposure without resolution. Milan prosecutors tried Eni, Shell, and thirteen individuals from 2018; the Tribunal acquitted every defendant in March 2021, and Italy's prosecutors withdrew their appeal in July 2022.⁴
- A parallel financial claim. Nigeria sued JPMorgan in London for 1.7 billion dollars over the escrow account that released funds to Malabu-linked accounts; London's High Court dismissed the claim in June 2022.
- Recovery efforts that outlived the case. Nigeria's anti-corruption agency recovered more than 200 million dollars in frozen assets even as the underlying ownership question stayed open.²
- A civil claim withdrawn, not won. Nigeria dropped its remaining 1.1 billion dollar civil actions in Italy in November 2023, a pragmatic concession rather than an exoneration.²
- A negotiated exit rather than a court verdict. The March 2026 agreement converts OPL 245 into two development and two exploration licences, with Nigerian Agip Exploration as operator, NNPC and Shell as partners, and termination of the remaining arbitration.⁵

The Geostrategic Logic of Attached Conditions
The OPL 245 file is unusual in duration but not in mechanism. Nigeria's Petroleum Industry Act gave deepwater operators a one-year window to convert legacy oil prospecting licences into the new fiscal regime, a deadline that fell in August 2022 for OMLs 128, 130, 132, 133, and 138, covering assets operated by Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies.⁶ NNPC's group chief executive Mele Kyari framed the renegotiation as resolving disputes running since 2007, and NNPC priced the settlement at an additional five billion dollars in government revenue against roughly five hundred billion dollars in projected long-run receipts.⁶ Nigeria bundled a separate 2021, twenty-year renewal of the Bonga field's OML 118 to Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, and Eni with settlement of tax disputes and unresolved fiscal-term interpretation rather than issuing it as a clean administrative rollover.
Two things follow. First, Abuja treats licence continuation and fiscal-term revision as one negotiation, not sequential steps, so operators who assume renewal is procedural misread the process. Second, resolution timing correlates more with the government's need for investment headlines and revenue than with legal merits, which is why OPL 245 moved after nearly three decades once Nigeria needed deepwater investment decisions to offset falling onshore output, and why OML 118 stayed unresolved until tax and fiscal concessions made renewal politically presentable.

The Geostrategic Signal for Boards Watching Nigeria
The test for any operator holding or bidding on Nigerian deepwater acreage is not whether a licence will eventually convert or renew. History says it likely will, given the reserves at stake and the government's need for dollar revenue. The test is what gets attached before that happens and what would move the timeline. Three markers matter more than the headline settlement:
- Contract execution versus announcement. Reuters reported that final OPL 245 contracts were expected to begin signing the Monday after the March 2 announcement, a gap between agreement and signed paper that has closed slowly before in this file.¹
- Parallel investigations still open. A Dutch investigation into the same transaction remained unresolved as of early 2025, and a Brescia court convicted two former Milan prosecutors of withholding evidence in October 2024; legal exposure around the 2011 payment has not fully closed even as Nigeria's own claims did.²
- Whether first investment decisions follow the paper. Nigeria sold the 2022 deepwater PSC settlement on four billion dollars in immediate final investment decisions; whether OPL 245's four new licences convert to sanctioned development, rather than another multi-year gap between signature and spend, is the marker separating genuine resolution from another administrative pause.⁶
Fortius Intel note: Treat every Nigerian upstream licence or fiscal-term milestone as a negotiation checkpoint, not a compliance date. The relevant question for a board is which unresolved claim, election cycle, or revenue shortfall could reopen terms that look settled on paper.
Methodology: Analysis draws on Reuters reporting via CNBC Africa (March 2 and March 6, 2026), Business Post Nigeria (March 3, 2026), Eni's official OPL 245 case documentation, The Guardian Nigeria (August 13, 2022), and AllAfrica (May 27, 2021). All cited sources are publicly available.
Footnotes
1 Reuters, "Nigeria splits OPL 245 oilfield into four blocks under deal with Eni, Shell, source says," via CNBC Africa, March 2, 2026. Reports Nigeria agreed to split the OPL 245 block into four assets operated by Eni and Shell, with final contracts expected to begin signing the following Monday. Available at https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/nigeria-splits-opl-245-oilfield-into-four-blocks-under-deal-with-eni-shell-source-says/
2 Business Post Nigeria, "Nigeria Splits OPL 245 into Four Blocks for Eni, Shell," March 3, 2026. Cites the 1.3 billion dollar original purchase price, more than 200 million dollars recovered by Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nigeria's November 2023 withdrawal of a 1.1 billion dollar civil claim in Italy, and reserve estimates of up to nine billion barrels of oil equivalent. Available at https://businesspost.ng/economy/nigeria-splits-opl-245-into-four-blocks-for-eni-shell/
3 Eni, "OPL245: the history of the block's acquisition," Eni official case documentation. Confirms the April 1998 award of OPL 245 to Malabu Oil and Gas for a twenty-million-dollar signature bonus during Dan Etete's tenure as petroleum minister, and the 2011 transfer to Shell and Eni. Available at https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/opl245-case-process-nigeria/history-acquisition-opl245-block.html
4 TheCable, "Italian court acquits prosecutors in $1.3bn OPL 245 case," reporting on Milan Tribunal proceedings. Confirms the March 17, 2021 acquittal of Eni, Shell, and individual defendants on bribery charges related to the 2011 OPL 245 transfer, and the July 2022 withdrawal of the prosecution's appeal. Available at https://www.thecable.ng/italian-court-acquits-prosecutors-in-1-3bn-opl-245-case/
5 CNBC Africa (Reuters), "Eni confirms deal with Nigeria to split OPL 245 oilfield into four licences," March 6, 2026. Confirms the four-licence structure (two development, two exploration), Nigerian Agip Exploration as operator, and termination of related arbitration as part of the settlement. Available at https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2026/eni-confirms-deal-with-nigeria-to-split-opl-245-oilfield-into-four-licences/
6 The Guardian (Nigeria), "Nigeria eyes $500b revenue as IOCs, NNPC seal new contract," August 13, 2022. Reports the renegotiated deepwater production-sharing contracts for OMLs 128, 130, 132, 133, and 138 with Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies under the Petroleum Industry Act's statutory conversion deadline, including NNPC Group CEO Mele Kyari's comments on disputes running since 2007 and the projected five billion dollars in additional revenue against five hundred billion dollars in long-run receipts. Available at https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria-eyes-500b-revenue-as-iocs-nnpc-seal-new-contract/
About the author
Jay Bimbrah, Co-Founder & COO. A former Scotland Yard counter-terrorism investigator, Jay has advised EMEA tier-1 banks and Lloyd's market firms on distinguishing real exposure from theoretical risk.
